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vania declared that since reciprocal relations were at an end, transfer
taxes were to be imposed on our residents, at least during the period
between July 1, 1925 and March 12, 1928.6 No statute was passed
in that jurisdiction allowing retroactive reciprocal exemptions or
refunds. Reciprocity having failed during this period, it was proper
for the defendant to insist on proof of payment of the tax or waiver
thereof. The fact that the Court in the instant case found that our
reciprocity statute had not been affected by the failure of other sec-
tions of the same article had no effect on its decision because of the
fact that the Court in Pennsylvania construing its laws had deter-
mined that so far as that state was concerned no reciprocal relations
existed. No question arose as to the legitimacy of a Pennsylvania
tax on stock held by a person domiciled in this state. It has been
held recently that debts are subject to a transfer tax at but one place,
the domicile of the creditor.7 To avoid multiple taxation, reciprocal
exemption statutes are contained on the statute books of thirty-
seven states.
A. K. B.
INHERITANcE-TRANSFER TAX-INTANGIBLES-DOMICILE OF
OwNF..-Henry R. Taylor, while domiciled and residing in New
York, died testate. Included in his estate were negotiable bonds and
certificates of indebtedness issued by the state of Minnesota and its
subdivisions. All passed under his will which was probated in New
York where his estate was administered and a tax exacted upon the
entire testamentary transfer. The state of Minnesota assessed an
inheritance tax upon that portion of the estate consisting of obliga-
tions arising in that state. Deceased's executor contested the validity
of the, latter imposition. From a decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirming the validity of the assessment, plaintiff appeals.
Held, that the right asserted by the state is in conflict with the Four-
teenth Amendment and that the bonds and certificates may be validly
taxed at but one place-the domicile of the owner at his death.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98 (1930).
It does not appear that difficulty of any serious account was met
with in determining the right to impose taxes, whether direct or in-
direct, upon real property. The right to so tax was and is accorded
only to a state wherein the realty is situated. Perhaps the strongest
argument in support of the right lies in the universally recognized
characteristic of land-its immovability. No such right is time-
honored with respect to personalty. Under early common law it was
'Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, etc.,
147 Atl. 71 (May, 1929).
Farmers Loan & Trust Company v. State of Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct, Rep. 98 (1930). See infra below.
TAX COMMENT
usual and customary for an individual to have in his possession all
his personalty. And, if he changed his abode from one land to
another, his stock of horses, cattle and other chattels would go with
him. Out of this early custom sprang a fiction, inobilia sequuntur
personam, which persisted in the light of logic and fact. Applying
the fiction it was only possible to tax tangible property at the domicile
of its owner wherever in fact the property was situated. As time
passed and the importance of tangible personal property increased,
fiction gave way to fact and the dictates of sense led the courts to
declare that tangible personal property might be taxed only by the
state wherein the property was permanently situated.1 "The argu-
ment against the taxability of land within the jurisdiction of another
state applies with equal cogency to tangible personal property beyond
the jurisdiction." 2 Of equal moment because of its prominence is
the subject of taxation of intangible personal property. The Court
in the instant case states the presently approved doctrine that no state
may tax anything not in her jurisdiction.3 ' Thus stated the doctrine
appears elementary. As applied, however, no little difficulty is en-
countered. For instance, it had been decided in Blackstone v.
Miller 4 that the state of the debtor had jurisdiction to impose a
testamentary transfer tax on a debt or other chosen action held by a
deceased non-resident creditor. The Court stated:
"What gives the debt validity? Nothing but the fact
that the law of the place where the debtor is will make him
pay. It does not matter that the law would not need to be
invoked in the particular case. Most of us do not commit
crimes, yet we nevertheless are subject to the criminal law,
and it affords one of the motives for our conduct. So again,
what enables any other than the very creditor in proper person
to collect the debt? The law of the same place. To test it,
suppose that New York should turn back the current of legis-
lation and extend to debts the rule applied to slander that
actio personalis nwritur cun persona, and should provide
that all debts hereafter contracted in New York and payable
there should be extinguished by the death of either party.
Leaving constitutional considerations on one side, it is plain
that the right of the foreign creditor would be gone." 1
In this statement lay the justification for the imposition of the tax in
the state of the debtor's domicile. However, the Court in the instant
'Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky. 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36
(1905) ; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 712 (1906) ; Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603 (1925); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202 (1926).
'Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra Note 1 at 490.
'Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872).
'188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277 (1903).
5 Supra Note 4 at 205, 206.
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case seeks to place taxation of intangibles on a practicable basis and
like unto tangible personal property to accord it immunity from
taxation at more than one place. The maxim mwbilia sequuntur
personam finds convenient application in that the situs of the debt is
to be found at the domicile of the owner. The doctrine that two
states may tax the same debt or other chose in action (at the domicile
of the creditor and at the domicile of the debtor), on more or
less inconsistent principles, without conflicting with the Fourteenth
Amendment, is no longer to be followed, and, "to prevent misunder-
standing it is definitely overruled." 6 The Court was not called upon
to consider whether intangibles other than debts were to be accorded
immunity from multiple taxation. The tenor of the opinion suggests
that that is the desired end.
A. K. B.
Quoted from the instant case.
